Energy crises: Who profits when the world runs short?

Blurs.co.uk
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When energy prices soar, households struggle, businesses come under pressure and governments scramble to respond. Yet some of the world’s largest energy companies can announce extraordinary profits. Is this simply the consequence of global markets, or has the energy system evolved into one that rewards companies when consumers have nowhere else to turn?

An uncomfortable pattern

There is a reason the question keeps returning. During periods when oil and gas prices surge, the companies that extract and trade those commodities can make enormous sums. The 2021–2023 energy shock was a striking example. As wholesale prices rose following the post-pandemic recovery and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, major producers reported record or near-record earnings. Shell reported adjusted earnings of about $39.9 billion in 2022, while BP reported underlying replacement-cost profit of about $27.7 billion.

For households, the same period meant higher bills, pressure on public finances and difficult choices about heating and food. The contrast is stark: the price shock that damaged consumers’ finances created a windfall for parts of the energy industry.

But a pattern of profits during a crisis is not, by itself, proof that the crisis was deliberately created. To understand what is happening, it is necessary to look at how energy markets work, who makes money at each stage, and what the evidence can — and cannot — tell us.

The difference between selling energy and producing it

“Energy companies” are often discussed as though they are one group. In reality, the industry contains businesses with very different roles: oil and gas producers, electricity generators, network operators, wholesalers and household energy suppliers.

That distinction matters. A household supplier buys energy on wholesale markets and sells it to customers. A producer extracts oil or gas and sells a commodity whose market price can rise sharply when supply is tight. An integrated company may operate in several parts of the chain, so losses in one division can coincide with substantial gains in another.

Britain’s experience during the energy shock illustrates the difference. Many retail suppliers were squeezed by rising wholesale costs and the regulated price cap. Some could not buy energy at a price that allowed them to honour the tariffs they had offered customers. The National Audit Office recorded that 29 suppliers failed between July 2021 and May 2022, affecting nearly four million households. Meanwhile, producers and some generators benefited from higher market prices.

How a crisis creates extraordinary profits

Oil and gas are traded in international markets. When demand rises, supplies are disrupted, or traders fear future shortages, prices can move quickly. Producers whose costs have not risen at the same rate can earn much more from each barrel or unit of gas they sell.

Several forces contributed to the 2021–2023 price shock. Demand rebounded as economies reopened after COVID-19 restrictions. Gas storage levels and supply availability were concerns. Competition for liquefied natural gas intensified, particularly as Asian buyers sought cargoes. Then Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the reduction of Russian gas flows into Europe transformed an already tight market into a major supply crisis.

These events did not affect every company equally. A producer with access to low-cost reserves could benefit enormously from a higher global price. A retailer buying energy at that same elevated price could struggle or fail. The phrase “energy companies made billions” therefore hides a crucial question: which companies, in which part of the market, and from what activity?

Britain’s electricity pricing system: why gas can set the price

One feature of the British electricity market has attracted particular criticism. Wholesale electricity is generally priced using a marginal-pricing system. Generators are dispatched to meet demand, and the most expensive generation needed at the margin can set the wholesale price for all accepted generation in that market period.

Gas-fired power stations are often the marginal generators. When gas prices rise, the wholesale electricity price can rise too — even when some electricity is being produced by nuclear, wind or solar plants whose immediate fuel costs are much lower.

This can mean that generators with lower operating costs receive a market price influenced by expensive gas generation. The result is not necessarily evidence of wrongdoing: it is a consequence of the market design. But it does raise legitimate questions about whether the system distributes the benefits and costs fairly, particularly when consumers are paying bills that reflect the most expensive source needed to meet demand.

Not every generator benefits in the same way. Some renewable projects operate under Contracts for Difference, which provide a stabilising strike price and require payments back when market prices exceed the agreed level. Contract structures, hedging and ownership all affect the final outcome.

The £143 billion question

The End Fuel Poverty Coalition’s energy-firm profits tracker estimated on 17 November 2026 that companies had made around £143 billion in profits from UK operations since the energy-bills crisis began. Its tracker examines published company accounts and industry information across a group of major firms.

That is a striking figure, but it needs to be read carefully. It is an estimate produced by a campaigning coalition, not an official government audit or a single consolidated account. The companies operate internationally, and allocating profits to UK operations can involve assumptions where reporting does not provide a neat UK-only figure. The total should therefore be treated as an indicative estimate, not as a definitive measure of money taken directly from household bills.

Even with those qualifications, the broader issue is real: high commodity prices can produce very large earnings for parts of the energy industry while consumers face unaffordable bills. Public debate should distinguish that documented pattern from claims that have not been proven.

Were the crises actually manufactured?

This is the most serious allegation — and the one that requires the strongest evidence. There are genuine reasons to scrutinise the power held by energy-producing states, cartels, major companies and commodity traders. Decisions to restrict production can affect global prices. OPEC+ members coordinate output policy. Governments can use energy exports as geopolitical leverage. Companies make investment decisions that influence how much new supply becomes available.

These actions can contribute to scarcity or prolong tight markets. They deserve scrutiny, especially where decisions are opaque and the consequences fall heavily on the public. But they are not automatically proof that a particular crisis was fabricated, or that companies secretly coordinated to create an emergency for profit.

To establish deliberate manufacture, investigators would need evidence of intent and coordination: for example, communications, agreements, deceptive conduct, or documented decisions designed to create a shortage while concealing the purpose. High prices, record profits, lobbying and concentrated market power may justify investigation, but none alone proves that allegation.

It is also important to distinguish deliberate manipulation from a market system that can reward scarcity. A company may profit from a shortage it did not create. It may also make decisions that worsen a shortage because those decisions are commercially advantageous. Both are important questions, but they are not the same claim.

Why don’t governments simply stop it?

Governments have tools, but none is simple. They can tax exceptional profits, regulate market behaviour, strengthen competition rules, change electricity-market design, support vulnerable households and invest in alternative sources of energy. Each option has trade-offs.

Windfall taxes can recover some gains when prices rise unexpectedly, but the design matters. If a tax is unpredictable or poorly structured, it may discourage investment in future production. If it is too weak, it may leave the public with little return from extraordinary gains. Tax rules also need to be transparent enough for the public to understand who pays and who benefits.

Market reform is equally complicated. Changing how electricity is priced could reduce the influence of gas on the prices received by other generators, but policymakers must preserve reliable supply and ensure that investment in new generation continues. The answer is not simply to declare that every low-cost generator should receive the same price as its production cost; financing, balancing, storage and network costs also have to be accounted for.

The companies that failed while others prospered

The collapse of dozens of British retail suppliers is an important part of this story. It shows why describing the whole industry as one group of profiteers is misleading. Some suppliers had weak business models, inadequate hedging or insufficient financial resilience. When wholesale prices rose faster than the retail price cap could adjust, they were exposed.

Customers did not simply lose their energy supply, because Ofgem’s Supplier of Last Resort process moved them to other providers. But the failures created costs, disruption and pressure on the wider system. The National Audit Office’s review found that the supplier market had not been resilient enough to withstand the shock.

At the same time, the collapse of retailers did not mean that every part of the energy business was losing money. Producers selling into high-priced markets could be making exceptional returns. This is why it is essential to separate the economics of supply from the economics of extraction and generation.

Who is really paying for the energy crisis?

Households pay through bills, but the costs are spread more widely. Businesses face higher operating expenses and may pass them on through prices. Governments fund support schemes, which ultimately draw on taxation or borrowing. Public services and local organisations also face higher energy costs.

The effects are unequal. Wealthier households may be able to absorb a temporary increase, improve insulation or switch technology. Lower-income households often live in less efficient homes and spend a greater share of their income on energy. For them, a price shock can mean choosing between heating, food and other essentials.

That distributional impact is central to the debate. Even if a price surge is caused by genuine international disruption rather than deliberate manipulation, it remains a political question whether the costs and benefits are being shared fairly.

What needs to change?

First, the public needs clearer reporting. Large energy groups should make it easier to understand where profits are generated, how much tax is paid in each jurisdiction, and how their trading and production activities contribute to results. Where estimates rely on assumptions, those assumptions should be visible.

Second, regulators need the resources and authority to investigate market abuse, anti-competitive conduct and misleading claims. Market concentration and opaque trading are reasons for strong oversight, not reasons to jump to conclusions before the evidence is examined.

Third, Britain needs an energy system less exposed to sudden fossil-fuel price shocks. That means a resilient mix of low-carbon generation, storage, flexible demand, interconnection and networks capable of moving electricity where it is needed. It also means improving insulation and energy efficiency so that households need less energy in the first place.

Finally, governments should be prepared to explain how exceptional profits are taxed and how the proceeds benefit the public. If the public carries the risk when the system fails, it is reasonable to ask why the public should not share more fairly in the rewards when parts of that system prosper.

The bigger question

There is no credible basis for declaring that energy crises as a whole are deliberately manufactured by energy companies simply because those companies sometimes make enormous profits during them. The evidence points to a more complicated picture: international supply shocks, geopolitical decisions, market structures, corporate strategy and regulatory choices all interact.

But rejecting an unproven conspiracy does not mean accepting the status quo. A system can be legal and still be unfair. It can operate according to its rules and still transfer wealth towards companies that are best placed to benefit from scarcity. And a market can reward decisions that leave consumers exposed, even without a secret plan to create a crisis.

If energy crises are so profitable for some of the companies involved, who is making sure the public is not left carrying the cost while others collect the rewards?

Sources and further reading

Editorial note: This investigation distinguishes documented company profits and market mechanisms from allegations of deliberate crisis creation. The latter would require direct evidence of intent and coordination; it should not be presented as established fact.

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