Earth’s Natural Resources in 2150: What Will Be Left, and What Could Run Short?

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Image: Blue Marble 2002. NASA Goddard Space Flight Center; image by Reto Stöckli, enhancements by Robert Simmon. Public domain (US government work). Source: NASA Earth Observatory, https://science.nasa.gov/earth/earth-observatory/the-blue-marble-true-color-global-imagery-at-1km-resolution/.
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By 2150, will humanity still have enough fresh water, fertile soil, forests, food, timber and metals to support a global population and an increasingly technological civilisation? The honest answer is that nobody can calculate a reliable inventory of what will remain that far ahead. The best scientific assessments generally model the next 20 to 40 years, not the next 124. But those assessments reveal the pressures already building — and the way they can reinforce one another.

The central danger is not that Earth will simply run out of everything. It is that accessible, affordable and ecologically sustainable supplies may become harder to obtain in particular regions, at particular times, and for particular communities. A resource can remain abundant in the geological sense while becoming scarce in practice because it is polluted, depleted locally, too expensive to extract, politically inaccessible or needed faster than nature can replace it.

This investigation uses the latest major assessments available in 2026, including the UN Environment Programme’s Global Resources Outlook, the UN’s 2025 water assessment, the FAO’s 2025 land and water report, the FAO’s 2025 forest assessment and the International Energy Agency’s 2025 critical minerals outlook. Their projections are not forecasts for 2150. They are evidence of the direction and scale of pressures that could shape the century ahead.

The scale of the resource challenge

Humanity’s extraction of natural resources has risen dramatically. The UN International Resource Panel estimated that global material extraction increased from about 30 billion tonnes in 1970 to 106 billion tonnes in 2020. Under its historical-trends scenario, extraction could be around 60 per cent higher by 2060 than in 2020. This includes biomass, fossil fuels, metal ores and non-metallic minerals such as sand, gravel and stone.

That is not a prediction that the planet will be physically empty by 2060. It is a projection of the annual flow of materials being taken from the environment. The distinction matters: many resources are stocks, such as mineral deposits, while others are renewable flows, such as annual forest growth, fish reproduction or river recharge. Some materials can be recycled; others are dispersed, consumed or degraded during use.

The same UN assessment models a different outcome if governments and industries change course. Stronger resource efficiency, more circular production, lower material intensity and changes in consumption could cause extraction to peak around 2040 and fall back to roughly 20 per cent above 2020 levels by 2060. The gap between these scenarios is a reminder that future scarcity is not predetermined.

Fresh water: a global supply, but a local crisis

Earth is not short of water in total. Most of it is seawater, however, and only a small fraction of the planet’s water is readily accessible fresh water in rivers, lakes and shallow groundwater. Much of the freshwater is locked in glaciers, ice sheets or deep underground. The usable supply is unevenly distributed and varies with seasons, rainfall, infrastructure and climate.

The UN World Water Development Report 2025 reports that agriculture accounted for about 72 per cent of global freshwater withdrawals in 2021, industry 15 per cent and municipal use 13 per cent. Total withdrawals had risen by 14 per cent since 2000. These figures describe withdrawals, not the amount permanently consumed: some water returns to rivers or aquifers, although often at a different time, place or quality.

Water stress is already severe in many regions. The 2025 report notes that 25 countries, home to around one-quarter of the world’s population, experience extremely high water stress every year. Climate change can intensify drought, alter the timing of snowmelt, reduce glacier-fed supplies in the long term and make rainfall more erratic. Growing cities, irrigation, industry and energy production add competing demands.

By 2150, the critical question may not be how much water remains on Earth, but whether river basins and aquifers can provide reliable clean water where people and ecosystems need it. Groundwater is especially vulnerable where pumping exceeds natural recharge. Once an aquifer is heavily depleted, recovery can take decades, centuries or longer; in some geological settings, compaction permanently reduces the amount of water it can store.

Desalination, wastewater recycling, leakage reduction, more efficient irrigation and better watershed management can expand effective supply. But desalination requires energy and infrastructure, can create concentrated brine and is not a practical universal answer for inland regions. Water scarcity is therefore likely to remain a question of governance, investment and geography as much as absolute planetary quantity.

Food: production can grow, but the foundations are under pressure

Food is renewable, but the systems that produce it depend on finite or vulnerable foundations: fertile soil, freshwater, stable seasons, pollinators, fisheries, nutrients, energy and functioning ecosystems. Increasing yields can compensate for some pressure, but productivity gains are not guaranteed and cannot indefinitely overcome every form of environmental damage.

The FAO’s 2025 assessment of land and water resources says agriculture will need to produce about 50 per cent more food, feed and fibre in 2050 than it produced in 2012. It also estimates that more than 1.6 billion hectares of land — over 10 per cent of the world’s land area — have been degraded by human activity. More than 60 per cent of this degradation is on agricultural land, including cropland and pasture.

Soil erosion, salinisation, compaction, loss of organic matter and contamination can reduce the productive capacity of farmland. Soil is not simply dirt that can be replaced at will. It is a living system that may take hundreds or thousands of years to develop, although careful management can restore some functions much faster.

Climate change adds another layer. Heat stress can reduce crop yields, drought can undermine harvests and extreme rainfall can wash away soil or destroy crops. At the same time, higher atmospheric carbon dioxide can benefit some plants under certain conditions, but this does not cancel the effects of heat, water stress, nutrient limitations, pests and extreme weather. Impacts vary greatly by crop and region.

There is no single global date when food production collapses. Some regions may become more productive while others face growing losses. Trade can move food from surplus areas to deficit areas, but export restrictions, conflict, transport disruption, fertiliser shortages or simultaneous harvest failures can turn local problems into international price shocks.

By 2150, food security will depend on whether societies protect soils and water, develop climate-resilient crops, reduce avoidable food waste, improve storage and distribution, manage fertiliser use, and adapt diets and farming systems to local ecological limits. The amount of food produced globally is only part of the story: access, affordability and nutrition matter just as much.

Forests and timber: renewable only if managed within limits

Forests provide timber, fuel, paper fibre, medicines, food, carbon storage, rainfall regulation, soil protection and habitat. They are renewable in the sense that trees can regrow, but the loss of an old-growth forest cannot be reversed simply by planting a new plantation. Species composition, soils, water cycles and complex habitats may take centuries to recover.

The FAO’s Global Forest Resources Assessment 2025 tracks forest extent, condition, management and use from 1990 to 2025. Its data are essential for understanding trends, but they do not provide a reliable global timber inventory for 2150. Earlier FAO modelling of the forest sector projected global roundwood production rising by about 13 per cent to 4.3 billion cubic metres by 2050, with industrial roundwood production increasing more sharply. Such projections depend on assumptions about plantations, demand, trade and forest management.

Demand for timber could rise as construction uses more engineered wood and industries seek alternatives to fossil-based materials. This could reduce emissions in some applications, but it can also increase pressure on forests if supply is not sustainable. Illegal logging, agricultural expansion, fires, pests, drought and fragmentation can undermine forest resilience.

Plantations can supply substantial volumes of wood, but they do not automatically replace the ecological value of natural forests. A future with abundant timber is possible if production shifts towards sustainable plantations, longer-lived wood products, reuse, recycled fibre and responsible harvesting. A future with shrinking natural forests is also possible if demand and land conversion outpace protection and restoration.

Metals and minerals: not disappearing, but harder to supply

Metals such as iron, aluminium, copper, nickel, lithium, cobalt and rare earth elements are not renewable on human timescales. But it is misleading to say that the world is about to run out of them. Geological resources are not the same as economically recoverable reserves. Reserves change with prices, technology, exploration, regulation and the discovery of new deposits.

The challenge is often the quality, location and accessibility of deposits. As richer ores are mined, producers may have to process more rock to obtain the same quantity of metal. That can mean higher energy and water use, more waste rock and tailings, larger infrastructure requirements and greater environmental risks. New deposits may be remote, technically difficult or located in politically sensitive regions.

The International Energy Agency’s Global Critical Minerals Outlook 2025 illustrates how quickly demand could change. Under its Stated Policies Scenario, lithium demand is projected to grow fivefold between 2024 and 2040; graphite and nickel demand double; cobalt and magnet rare earth demand rise by around 50 to 60 per cent; and copper demand grows by about 30 per cent. These increases are driven in part by electric vehicles, batteries, electricity grids, wind turbines and other technologies.

The IEA also identifies potential supply gaps. Based on announced projects, mined copper supply in its Stated Policies Scenario could fall around 30 per cent short of projected demand in 2035, and lithium supply around 40 per cent short. These are scenario-based estimates, not proof that the metals will be unavailable: new mines, substitution, efficiency, recycling and changes in demand can alter the outcome. But mines take many years to develop, making sudden demand surges difficult to meet.

Recycling is one of the most important ways to reduce pressure. The IEA estimates that successful expansion of recycling could lower the need for new mining activity by 5 to 30 per cent by 2040 in its Stated Policies Scenario. In a climate-pledge scenario, recycling could reduce new mine development needs by 2050 by around 35 per cent for copper, more than 20 per cent for lithium and 15 per cent for nickel. Metals can circulate through the economy repeatedly, although collection, contamination and processing losses mean recycling is not perfect.

For 2150, the likely issue is not that every metal deposit has been exhausted. It is whether societies have built systems that recover metals from buildings, vehicles, electronics, infrastructure and industrial waste — and whether they can obtain the remaining primary supply without unacceptable ecological and social costs.

Fossil fuels, energy and the materials transition

Coal, oil and natural gas are finite geological resources, but estimates of how much remains economically recoverable vary. Their future use will depend not only on geology but also on climate policy, technology, prices and alternatives. A large share of known fossil fuel resources may need to remain unused if the world is to limit warming in line with international climate goals.

Moving away from fossil fuels does not mean a move away from resource use. Renewable energy systems require land, metals, concrete, glass, plastics, transmission lines and storage. The transition changes the resource mix: it can reduce the extraction and combustion of fossil fuels while increasing demand for certain minerals and materials. The long-term outcome depends on design, durability, repair, recycling and how much energy society consumes.

Energy itself is not a finite mineral stock in the same way as copper or oil. Sunlight, wind, tides and geothermal heat are continually available, but capturing them requires equipment and infrastructure. Reliable energy systems also need storage, transmission and backup capacity. A resource transition can therefore solve one constraint while creating another unless the entire system is planned carefully.

Fisheries, biodiversity and the resources we do not count

Wild fish populations are renewable only when fishing pressure, habitat and ocean conditions allow them to reproduce. Overfishing, warming seas, acidification, pollution and damage to breeding grounds can reduce stocks or shift them geographically. Aquaculture can supply more seafood, but it also requires feed, energy, water, disease management and careful control of pollution and escapes.

Biodiversity is often treated as a separate environmental issue, but it underpins resource production. Pollinators support crops; wetlands filter water and reduce floods; forests regulate local climates; healthy soils depend on organisms; and diverse ecosystems can be more resilient to shocks. Extinction is effectively irreversible on human timescales. A lost species cannot be brought back by finding a substitute commodity.

These ecological services rarely appear in a simple calculation of timber, food or mineral reserves. Their loss can nevertheless increase the cost and difficulty of obtaining those resources. A farm that loses pollinators, a watershed that loses wetlands or a fishery that loses nursery habitat may become less productive even if the land or water remains physically present.

The compounding effects: why pressures can multiply

Resource pressures do not operate independently. Their interaction is what makes a long-range outlook difficult — and potentially dangerous. Several examples show how a shock in one system can spread into others.

  • Heat, drought and food: higher temperatures increase evaporation and crop water demand. Drought reduces harvests, while reservoirs and groundwater are drawn down. Farmers may pump more water, increasing energy costs and further depleting aquifers.
  • Forest loss and rainfall: clearing forests can reduce local moisture recycling, increase erosion and alter runoff. This can damage agriculture and water supplies beyond the cleared area, depending on regional climate and landscape conditions.
  • Mining and water: mines need water for processing and can compete with communities and farms. Poorly managed tailings or contaminated drainage can make water unusable, turning a local pollution event into a long-term supply problem.
  • Energy and fertiliser: modern agriculture relies on energy for machinery, transport, irrigation and fertiliser production. Energy price shocks can raise food costs; fertiliser disruption can reduce yields, while attempts to compensate through land expansion can damage forests and habitats.
  • Extreme weather and supply chains: floods, storms, fires and heatwaves can disrupt mines, ports, power networks, roads and crop regions at the same time. Global trade can spread the consequences of geographically concentrated failures.
  • Population, consumption and inequality: more people increase total demand, but consumption per person varies enormously. Wealthier societies often use far more materials. Unequal access can mean scarcity for vulnerable groups even where national or global supplies appear sufficient.

These interactions can create feedback loops. For example, water scarcity can reduce food production; higher food prices can encourage new land clearance; land clearance can worsen erosion and regional water regulation; and lower agricultural productivity can then increase pressure to clear still more land. Not every feedback will occur everywhere, and technology or policy can interrupt many of them. But treating each resource as an isolated problem risks underestimating the combined effect.

What might the world look like in 2150?

There is no scientifically defensible figure for the percentage of Earth’s natural resources that will remain in 2150. No credible global assessment can tell us that a certain share of freshwater, timber or metal will be left on that date. The answer depends on population, consumption, technological change, climate, governance, discoveries, recycling and the choices made over the next century.

It is more useful to consider three broad pathways. They are not precise forecasts, but scenarios that extend the direction of current evidence.

A high-pressure pathway

If high material consumption continues, climate change accelerates, ecosystems are degraded and recycling remains inadequate, the world could enter the next century with more frequent regional water crises, stressed agricultural systems, declining natural habitats and expensive competition for certain minerals. There may still be large quantities of resources underground and in the oceans, but extraction could become more damaging and supplies more vulnerable to disruption. Wealthier countries and groups may buy their way through shortages while poorer communities bear the consequences.

A managed but unequal pathway

Under a middle pathway, technology and adaptation improve, but progress is uneven. Some regions protect forests, restore soils and recycle materials; others experience persistent water stress, food insecurity and ecological decline. Mineral supply expands to support electrification, while bottlenecks and geopolitical concentration remain. The planet is not exhausted, but the cost of maintaining living standards rises in vulnerable places and the gap between resource-secure and resource-insecure populations widens.

A resource-efficient pathway

If societies rapidly reduce waste, design products for repair and reuse, recycle metals at scale, protect watersheds and natural forests, restore degraded land and shift towards lower-impact energy and food systems, the 22nd century could inherit a more resilient resource base. Technological progress could make it possible to provide good living standards with much less extraction per person. This would not eliminate scarcity or ecological limits, but it could greatly reduce the risk of cascading shortages.

Can technology find a way out?

Technology will matter enormously. Precision agriculture, drought-tolerant crops, improved irrigation, desalination, wastewater recycling, low-carbon fertiliser, alternative battery chemistries, mineral recovery from waste, engineered timber and better materials design could all reduce pressure. Artificial intelligence and satellite monitoring may help detect leaks, illegal logging, crop stress and changes in ecosystems earlier.

But efficiency can sometimes produce a rebound effect: if a service becomes cheaper, people may use more of it. More efficient vehicles can lead to more driving; cheaper materials can encourage larger buildings; improved extraction technology can make previously uneconomic deposits profitable and increase total mining. Efficiency needs to be combined with sensible limits, durable design and policies that protect ecosystems.

There are also physical limits. Desalination cannot recreate a collapsed ecosystem. Recycling cannot recover every dispersed material. Carbon removal cannot instantly restore a lost glacier or extinct species. New technologies can shift environmental impacts rather than remove them. The most robust strategy is to prevent avoidable damage, not assume that future inventions will repair every consequence.

The real question is what we leave behind

Earth is not on course to become a barren rock devoid of water, minerals or life by 2150. The planet contains enormous quantities of materials, and many resources can be renewed, substituted or recycled. But the existence of a resource is not the same as a sustainable supply. Freshwater can be in the wrong place; soil can be exhausted; forests can be converted; fisheries can collapse; and mineral deposits can become uneconomic or environmentally unacceptable to exploit.

The most important warning from current research is that the pressure is already measurable. Material extraction has more than tripled since 1970. Agriculture is pushing against land and water constraints. Some critical minerals face projected supply gaps within a decade. Climate change and biodiversity loss can magnify these pressures and make them interact.

By 2150, the difference between a resource-rich world and a resource-poor one may not be determined by how much nature originally contained. It may be determined by whether humanity learned to use resources at a rate that ecosystems can withstand, whether it shared them fairly, and whether it preserved the natural systems that make them useful in the first place.

Sources and further reading

Editorial note: The year 2150 is used here as a long-range scenario horizon, not as a date for which a precise global resource forecast exists. Quantitative figures are attributed to the nearer-term assessment years and scenarios from which they originate.

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